

Transportation Safety Board of Canada Bureau de la sécurité des transports du Canada

TSB presentation to NATA 2014

NATA Annual General Meeting 2014 Joe Hincke Member, Transportation Safety Board Whitehorse, Yukon, 29 April 2014



Outline

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 - Report summary
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About the TSB

Mission: To advance transportation safety in the marine, pipeline, rail, and air modes of transportation that are under federal jurisdiction by:

- conducting independent investigations
- identifying safety deficiencies
- identifying causes and contributing factors
- making recommendations
- making our reports public



TSB Offices

- Head Office is in Gatineau, Quebec
- The Engineering Laboratory is in Ottawa, Ontario
- Regional offices are located across the country to allow investigators to quickly reach the scene of an accident:



- Vancouver, British Columbia
- Calgary, Alberta
- Edmonton, Alberta
- Winnipeg, Manitoba
- Toronto, Ontario
- Montréal, Quebec
- Québec, Quebec
- Halifax, Nova Scotia



Lillabelle Lake (A12O0071)





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Lillabelle Lake: Key Findings

- There was significant mechanical turbulence and associated wind shear.
- During the attempted overshoot, the rapid application of full power caused the aircraft to yaw to the left, and a left roll quickly developed. This movement, in combination with a high angle of attack and low airspeed, likely caused the aircraft to stall.
- The pilot survived the impact, but was unable to exit the aircraft, possibly due to difficulties finding or opening an exit. The pilot subsequently drowned.
- The rear-seat passenger did not have a shoulder harness and was critically injured. The passenger's head struck the pilot's seat in front; this passenger did not exit the aircraft and drowned.



Lillabelle Lake: Recommendations

• The Department of Transport require underwater egress training for all flight crews engaged in commercial seaplane operations. (A13-02)

Current status: Satisfactory Intent

• The Department of Transport require that all seaplanes in commercial service certificated for 9 or fewer passengers be fitted with seatbelts that include shoulder harnesses on all passenger seats. (A13-03)

Current status: Unsatisfactory



Previous TSB Floatplane Recommendations

• The Department of Transport require that all new and existing commercial seaplanes be fitted with regular and emergency exits that allow rapid egress following a survivable collision with water. (A11-05)

Current status: Unable to Assess

• The Department of Transport require that occupants of commercial seaplanes wear a device that provides personal flotation following emergency egress. (A11-06)

Current status: Satisfactory Intent



Resolute Bay (A11H0002)









Stabilized approaches





Stabilized approaches: Recommendation

Transport Canada require CARs Subpart 705 operators to monitor and reduce the incidence of unstable approaches that continue to a landing. (A14-01)





Crew Resource Management





CRM: Safety Concern

The Board is concerned that, without a comprehensive and integrated approach to CRM by Transport Canada and aviation operators, flight crews may not routinely practise effective CRM.





Conclusions

- Floatplanes: More is needed from the regulator, but ...
- Many companies are already taking independent, proactive action, rather than waiting for mandatory regulations from TC. (e.g., egress training, PFDs, pop-out windows and doors)
- Stabilized approaches: Too many are continued to a landing. Companies need to provide specific guidance in SOPs, or use technology to monitor and identify instances of risk.
- CRM: we want to see a comprehensive and integrated approach to monitor and reinforce best practices.



Questions?





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